The Social Cost of Investor Distraction: Evidence from Institutional Cross-Blockholding

Institutional investors routinely hold blocks of stocks in multiple firms within an industry. While such cross-blockholding boosts a portfolio firm's financial performance, could it distract investors from attending to firm activities in a nonfinancial domain, hurting its performance in that domain? The authors answer this question in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). They first document that cross-held firms perform worse on social responsibility than non-cross-held firms do. A quasi-natural experiment based on mergers between institutional blockholders helps establish causality. Next and as their primary contribution, the authors demonstrate investor distraction as the mechanism. Using two proxies of distraction—EDGAR search volume and shareholder proposals on socially responsible investment—they show that the negative impact of institutional cross-blockholding on CSR mainly comes from investor distraction when investors hold multiple blocks simultaneously. By highlighting the social cost of institutional cross-blockholding, this article finds a distraction effect of institutional cross-ownership, which extends our understanding of this unique ownership structure.

@article{astvansh2023social,
  title = {{The social cost of investor distraction: Evidence from institutional cross-blockholding}},
  author = {Vivek Astvansh and Tao Chen and Jimmy Chengyuan Qu},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {18},
  number = {12},
  pages = {e0286336},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0286336}
}